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Abstract
We characterize, in minimum cost spanning tree problems, the family of rules satis-
fying monotonicity over cost and population. We also prove that the set of allocations
induced by the family coincides with the irreducible core.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study minimum cost spanning tree problems (mcstp, for short). A group
of agents (denoted by N), located at different geographical places, want a particular ser-
vice which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source (denoted by 0).
Agents will be served through connections which involve some cost. However, they do not
care whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the source. This situation is de-
scribed by a symmetric matrix C, where cij denotes the connection costs between i and j
(i, j ∈ N ∪ {0}).
We assume that agents construct a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst). The question
is how to divide the cost associated with the mcst between the agents. One of the most
important topics is the axiomatic characterization of rules. The idea is to propose desirable
properties and to find out which of them characterize each rule. Properties often help
agents/planner to compare different rules and to decide which rule is preferred in a particular
situation.
In this paper we focus on two monotonicity properties. Population monotonicity claims
that if new agents join a "society" no agent from the "initial society" can be worse off; and
cost monotonicity claims that if connection costs weakly increase, no agent can be better off.
∗The authors wish to thank Aninbar Kar for his contribution to earlier versions of this paper. Financial
support from the Spanish government through grants ECO2008-03484-C02-01/ECON and ECO2011-23460
and the Xunta de Galicia through grant 10PXIB362299PR is gratefully acknowledged.
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In the literature there exist two families of rules satisfying both properties. The op-
timistic weighted Shapley rules studied in Bergantiños and Lorenzo-Freire (2008a, 2008b)
and obligation rules studied in Tijs et al. (2006), Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) and
Bergantiños and Kar (2010).
The main objective of this paper is to study the set of rules satisfying population
monotonicity and cost monotonicity. We focus on two aspects: to characterize the set of
rules satisfying both properties and to characterize the set of allocations induced by these
rules.
Given a mcstp C, Bird (1976) considers the irreducible matrix C∗, which is obtained
from C by reducing the cost of the arcs as much as possible, but without reducing the cost
of the mcst. Bird (1976) associates with each mcstp C a cooperative game with transferable
utility (N, vC). We prove that the set of allocations induced by rules satisfying population
monotonicity and cost monotonicity is the core of the game (N, vC∗), the so called irreducible
core.
A weaker version of population monotonicity is separability, which claims that if two
groups of agents can connect to the source independently of each other, then we can compute
their payments separately. A weaker version of cost monotonicity is reductionism, which
claims that the rule must depend only on the irreducible matrix. We identify a necessary
and sufficient condition for a family of rules to cover all the ones satisfying separability
and reductionism. In order to describe this condition, we need to define the so-called,
neighborhoods and extra-costs correspondences. A neighborhood is a group of agents that
are “closer” to each other than to any of the other agents or to the source. An extra-costs
correspondence is a way of dividing the savings obtained by the agents of a neighborhood
when they connect each other through an optimal network. The intuition behind such rules is
the following. Initially each agent is connected to the source in the irreducible matrix. Now,
agents inside neighborhoods are connected among them. For each neighborhood, the savings
are divided among the agents in the neighborhood following the extra-costs correspondence.
We characterize the set of rules satisfying population monotonicity and cost monotonicity,
which is a subset of the previous set. We need to select the extra-costs correspondences
satisfying the so called non-decreasing costs property, which says that the aggregate sum given
by the extra-costs correspondence should not decrease when the connection cost between two
consecutive neighborhoods is increased. We show how some well-known rules of the literature
satisfying both properties can be defined using the extra-costs correspondences.
Our result could be applied for identifying new class of rules satisfying both monotonicity
properties. We do it by introducing a class of rules that generalize the obligation rules.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and the notation.
In Section 3 we characterize the set of allocations induced by the rules satisfying population
and cost monotonicity. In Section 4 we characterize the set of rules satisfying separability and
reductionism. In Section 5 we characterize the set of rules satisfying population monotonicity
and cost monotonicity. In Section 6 we apply these results to some known rules in the
literature. The proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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2 Minimum cost spanning tree problems
We first introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems and some notation used through
the paper.
Let U = {1, 2, 3, ...} be the (infinite) set of possible agents, and let 0 be a special node
called the source.
A minimum cost spanning tree problem (mcstp) is a pair (N0, C0) where N0 = N ∪ {0},
N ⊂ U is finite and C0 = (cij)i,j∈N0 is a matrix with cii = 0 and cij = cji for all i, j ∈ N0.
A minimum cost connection problem (mccp) is a pair (N,C) where N ⊂ U is finite and
C = (cij)i,j∈N is a matrix with cii = 0 and cij = cji for all i, j ∈ N .
For simplicity, when N is clear, we write C0 instead of (N0, C0) and C instead of (N,C).
Let C0 be the set of all mcstp and let C be the set of all mccp.
Let ΠN denote the set of all orders in N. Given π ∈ ΠN , let Pre (i, π) denote the set of
agents inN which come before i in the order given by π, i.e., Pre (i, π) = {j ∈ N | π (j) < π (i)} .
As usually, R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. Given a nonempty set A,
let ∆(A) =
{
(xi)i∈A ∈ R
A
+ :
∑
i∈A
xi = 1
}
be the simplex in RA.
A graph in N0 is a subset of {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N0, i 	= j}. The cost of a graph g in (N0, C0)
is defined as c (g,C0) =
∑
{i,j}∈g
cij. Analogous definitions can be given for a graph in (N,C).
Given i, j ∈ N0, a path between i and j is a graph of different arcs {{ik−1, ik}}
K
k=1 such
that i0 = i and iK = j. A spanning tree in N0 is a graph in N0 in which there exists exactly
one path between any pair of nodes. Let G (N0) (or simply G0) denote the set of all graphs
in N0 and let T (N0) (or simply T0) denote the set of all spanning trees in N0. Analogously,
we define G (N) (or simply G) and T (N) (or simply T) for N .
A minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) in (N0, C0) (respectively, (N,C)) is a spanning
tree t in N0 (respectively, N) with minimum cost, namely m (t) = min
t′∈T0
m (t′) (respectively,
m (t) = min
t′∈T
m (t′)).
A mcst is not necessarily unique. However, all mcst in C0 (or in C) have the same cost,
that we denote as m (N0, C0) (or m (N,C)).
Given S ⊂ N , we denote as (S,CS) the restriction of (N,C) to S, and we denote as
(S0, (CS)0) the restriction of (N0, C0) to S.
We denote maxC := max
i,j∈N
cij and maxC0 := max
i,j∈N0
cij.
Given i, j ∈ N , α ∈ R+, we denote as αIij the matrix C given by ckl = 0 for all
{k, l} 	= {i, j} and cij = α.
Given C0 ∈ C0, the irreducible matrix of C0, denoted by C∗0 , is defined for each i, j ∈ N0
as
c∗ij = max
{k,l}∈τ ij
ckl (1)
where τ ij is the (unique) path that connects i and j in somemcst. This matrix is well-defined,
i.e. it does not depend on the chosen mcst.
Denote C∗0 = {C
∗
0 : C0 ∈ C0}. Analogously, C
∗ = {C∗ : C ∈ C}.
3
A rule is a function f that assigns to each C0 ∈ C0 a vector f (C0) ∈ RN such that∑
i∈N
fi (C0) = m (C0). As usual, fi (C0) represents the payoff assigned to agent i ∈ N .
We now introduce some properties of rules, which we will use in this paper.
Population Monotonicity (PM). For all mcstp (N0, C0), S ⊂ N , and i ∈ S, we have
fi (N0, C0) ≤ fi (S0, (CS)0) .
This property says that if new agents join a network, no agent from the initial network
can be worse off.
Cost Monotonicity (CM). For all mcstp (N0, C0) and (N0, C
′
0) such that C0 ≤ C
′
0, we
have
f (N0, C0) ≤ f (N0, C
′
0) .
This property says that if a number of connection costs increase and the rest of connection
costs (if any) remain the same, no agent can be better off. This property is also called
solidarity or strong cost monotonicity in some papers such as Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga
(2007) and Bergantiños and Kar (2010).
Separability (SEP ). For allmcstp (N0, C0) and S ⊂ N satisfyingm (N0, C0) = m (S0, (CS)0)+
m
(
(N\S)0 ,
(
CN\S
)
0
)
, we have
fi (N0, C) =
{
fi (S0, (CS)0) if i ∈ S
fi
(
(N\S)0 ,
(
CN\S
)
0
)
if i ∈ N\S.
Two subsets of agents, S and N\S, can be connected to the source either separately or
jointly. If there are no savings when they are jointly connected to the source, this property
says that the agents will pay the same in both circumstances. This property is also called
decomposition in some papers such as Megiddo (1978) and Granot and Huberman (1981).
Reductionism (RED). For all (N0, C0),
f (N0, C0) = f (N0, C
∗
0) .
If a rule satisfies this property, then it only depends on irreducible matrices. RED
appears in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010) and it is introduced in Bergantiños and Vidal-
Puga (2007) where it is called independence of irrelevant trees.
PM implies SEP but the reciprocal is false. CM implies RED but the reciprocal is
false. See Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007) for details.
3 The irreducible core
Bird (1976) introduces the irreducible core of a mcstp (N0, C0). We define the set of
monotonic allocations as the set of allocations induced by rules satisfying CM and PM.
In this section we prove that this set coincides with the irreducible core, defined as follows.
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A game with transferable utility, briefly a TU game, is a pair (N, v) where v : 2N → R
satisfies v (∅) = 0.
The core of a TU game (N, v) is defined as
core (N, v) =
{
(xi)i∈N :
∑
i∈N
xi = v (N) and
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v (S) ∀S ⊂ N
}
.
Bird (1976) associates with each mcstp (N0, C0) the game (N, vC0). For each coalition
S ⊂ N, vC0 (S) := m (S0, (CS)0) .
The irreducible core of a mcstp (N0, C0), denoted as IC (N0, C0), is the core of the TU
game
(
N, vC∗
0
)
where C∗0 is the irreducible matrix associated with C0.
Given a mcstp (N0, C0), let AM (N0, C0) denote the set of allocations induced by the
rules satisfying CM and PM . Namely, x ∈ AM (N0, C0) if and only if there exists a rule f
satisfying CM and PM such that x = f (N0, C0).
In the next theorem we prove that AM (N0, C0) and IC (N0, C0) coincide.
Theorem 1. For each mcstp (N0, C0) , AM (N0, C0) = IC (N0, C0) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
As a consequence of Theorem 1, any rule f satisfying CM and PM gives, for any mcstp
(N0, C0), an element f (N0, C0) in the irreducible core of (N0, C0) . Nevertheless, the recipro-
cal is not true. Given a rule f such that, for each mcstp (N0, C0) , f (N0, C0) ∈ IC (N0, C0) ,
it could be the case that f does not satisfy both monotonicity properties.
4 The set of rules satisfying separability and reduc-
tionism
In this section we characterize the set of rules satisfying SEP and RED. For doing it we
need some new definitions. A neighborhood is a group of agents that are “closer” to each
other than to any of the other agents or to the source. An extra-costs correspondence is a way
of dividing the savings obtained by the agents of a neighborhood when they connect among
themselves. The rules satisfying both properties could be described as follows. Initially each
agent is connected to the source in the irreducible matrix. Now, agents inside neighborhoods
are connected among them. For each neighborhood, the savings are divided among the
agents in the neighborhood following the extra-costs correspondence.
We first introduce the concepts which will be crucial in our results.
Given (N0, C0) ∈ C0 and S ⊂ N , |S| > 1, we define
δS = min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
cij − max
{i,j}∈τ(S)
cij
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where τ (S) ∈ T (S) is a mcst in S connecting all the agents in S. Even though τ (S) is
not necessarily unique, it is not difficult to check that max
{i,j}∈τ(S)
cij does not depend on the
particular τ (S) and hence δS is well defined. For S = {i}, we also define δ{i} = min
j∈N0\{i}
cij.
Roughly speaking, δS may be interpreted, when positive, as some kind of "distance"
between S and N0\S.
Definition 1. Let (N0, C0) be an mcstp. We say that S ⊂ N , |S| > 1, is a neighborhood
in C0 if δS > 0. We denote the set of all neighborhoods in C0 as Ne (C0).
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and C0 be such that c01 = 50, c12 = 20, c13 = 40,
c34 = 10, c15 = 60, c36 = 70, and cij > 70 otherwise. There are exactly two neighborhoods
containing node 1: {1, 2} because δ{1,2} = c13 − c12 = 20, and {1, 2, 3, 4} because δ{1,2,3,4} =
c01 − c13 = 50 − 40 = 10. Notice that {1, 2, 3} is not a neighborhood because δ{1,2,3} =
c34 − c13 = −30.
Some comments about neighborhoods. It is not difficult to check that the neighborhoods
of C0 and C
∗
0 coincide. Nevertheless, in general, (C
∗)S 	= (CS)
∗. Take for example N =
{1, 2, 3}, c12 = c13 = 1, c23 = 2 and S = {2, 3}. Then, c∗23 = 1 and hence C
′ = (C∗)S satisfies
c′23 = 1 whereas C
′′ = (CS)
∗ satisfies c′′23 = 2. Later on (Proposition 1.1) we prove that the
equality holds when S is a neighborhood.
The next proposition gives some results about neighborhoods.
Proposition 1.
1. S ⊂ N is a neighborhood in C0 if and only if S is a neighborhood in C∗0 . Besides,
(CS)
∗ = (C∗)S and
δS = min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
c∗ij −max
i,j∈S
c∗ij.
2. If S is a neighborhood in C0 and i ∈ S, then
S =
{
j ∈ N : c∗ij < min
k∈S,l∈N0\S
c∗kl
}
.
3. If S, S ′ are two neighborhoods in C∗0 ∈ C
∗
0 and S∩S
′ 	= ∅, then either S ⊂ S ′ or S ′ ⊂ S.
4. For each i ∈ N , there exists a unique family of subsets of N , S1, S2, ..., Sq with q ≥ 01
such that {S1, ..., Sq} is the set of neighborhoods that contain i, and S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ ... ⊂ Sq.
5. There exist no neighborhood in C0 if and only if {{0, i}}i∈N is a mcst in C0.
1Case q = 0 covers the situation in which agent i has no neighborhoods.
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Proof of Proposition 1. See the Appendix.
Under Proposition 1.1, for each neighborhood S ⊂ N , we have (C∗)S = (CS)
∗. We denote
this matrix as C∗S.
We now introduce the family of extra cost correspondences, which will be used in the
definition of the rules we characterize.
Definition 2. An extra-costs correspondence is a function e : C∗ ×R+ → RU+ satisfying:
(E1) ei (C
∗, x) = 0 for all (N,C∗) ∈ C∗, x ∈ R+, and i /∈ N .
(E2)
∑
i∈U
ei (C
∗, x) = x for all C∗ ∈ C∗, x ∈ R+.
Definition 3. For each extra-costs correspondence e we define the rule fe as follows.
Given (N0, C0) ∈ C0 and i ∈ N,
f ei (N0, C0) := c
∗
0i −
∑
S neighborhood
i∈S
(δS − ei (C
∗
S, δS)) .
The intuition behind such rules is the following. Initially each agent i pays c∗0i. Now,
agents inside neighborhoods are connected among them. For each neighborhood S, the
savings are divided among the agents in S following e. The larger is ei (C
∗
S, δS) , the smaller
is the saving (δS − ei (C
∗
S, δS)) corresponding to agent i in neighborhood S.
We compute f e in two examples.
Example 2. Let N = {1, 2} , c01 = 10, c02 = 15, and c12 = 2. Then, c∗10 = c
∗
20 = 10 and
c∗12 = 2. Let e be such that for each C
∗ and each x, e1 (C
∗, x) = 3x
4
and e2 (C
∗, x) = x
4
. There
is a unique neighborhood S = N with δN = 10− 2 = 8. Now,
f e1 (C0) = c
∗
01 − (δN − e1 (C
∗, 8)) = 10−
(
8−
3
4
8
)
= 8 and
f e1 (C0) = c
∗
02 − (δN − e2 (C
∗, 8)) = 10−
(
8−
1
4
8
)
= 4.
Example 1 (continuation). Let e be defined as ej (C
′∗, x) = x
|N ′|
for all (N ′, C ′∗) ∈ C
and j ∈ N (ej (C ′∗, x) = 0 otherwise). We compute fe1 (C0) . There are two neighborhoods
containing agent 1: S1 = {1, 2} and S2 = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Besides c
∗
01 = 50, δS1 = 20 and
δS2 = 10.
Then,
fe1 (C0) = 50−
(
δS2 − e2
(
C∗S2 , 10
))
−
(
δS1 − e1
(
C∗S1, 20
))
= 50− (10− 2.5)− (20− 10) = 32.5.
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It is not difficult to check that f e can also be defined as
fei (C0) = c
∗
0i −
∑
S neighborhood
i∈S

 ∑
j∈S\{i}
ej (C
∗
S, δS)

 .
In Proposition 2 we prove that each f e is a rule, namely,
∑
i∈N
f ei (N0, C0) = m (N0, C0) .
Proposition 2. For each extra-costs correspondence e, f e is a rule.
Proof of Proposition 2. See the Appendix.
In Theorem 2 we characterize this family of rules.
Theorem 2. A rule f satisfies Separability and Reductionism if and only if f = f e for
some extra-costs correspondence e.
Proof of Theorem 2. See the Appendix.
5 The set of rules satisfying population monotonicity
and cost monotonicity
In this section we characterize the set of rules satisfying both monotonicity properties. Since
PM implies SEP and CM implies RED, this set of rules will be a subset of the set char-
acterized in the previous section. We will prove that such set of rules coincides with the set
of rules induced by extra-costs correspondences satisfying a non-decreasing property.
We first introduce the concepts we will use.
Given (N1, C1) , (N2, C2) ∈ C, N1 ∩N2 = ∅, and a ∈ R+, we define(
N1 ∪N2, C1 ⊕a C
2
)
as the mccp C given by cij = c
α
ij if i, j ∈ N
α for some α ∈ {1, 2}, and cij = a+ maxC1 for
all i ∈ N1, j ∈ N2.
For convenience, we write C1 ⊕a C2 ⊕b C3 instead of (C1 ⊕a C2)⊕b C3, and so on.
Given a = (a1, ..., aΓ) ∈ RΓ+,
(
C1, ..., CΓ
)
∈ CΓ, and γ ≤ Γ we denote
Cγ (a) = C1 ⊕a1 C
2 ⊕a2 ...⊕aγ−1 C
γ.
Notice that, given γ > 1,
Cγ (a) = Cγ−1 (a)⊕aγ−1 C
γ . (2)
Definition 4. We say that an extra-costs correspondence e satisfies the Non-Decreasing
Costs (NDC) property if for all disjoint sequences {(Nγ, Cγ)}Γγ=1 ⊂ C
∗, Γ ≥ 1, i ∈ Nγi with
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Figure 1: Minimum cost connection problems Cγ (a) , Cγ (a′) for γ = 1, 2, 3. The NDC
property requires the aggregate assignment of extra costs for players 1, 2, 4 and 5 to be not
higher with a than with a′.
γi 	= 2, a ∈ R
Γ
+ with aγ ≥ maxC
γ+1 −maxCγ for all γ = 1, ...,Γ− 1, and y ∈ [0, a2] (y ≥ 0
when Γ = 1), we have
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
≥
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei (C
γ (a) , aγ)
where a′ = (a1 + y, a2 − y, a3, ..., aΓ) (a′ = (a1 + y) when Γ = 1).
In the next example we give an intuition of this technical property.
Example 3. Let Γ = 3, N1 = {1, 2} , c112 = 10,N
2 = {3} ,N3 = {4, 5} and c345 = 0.
Then, a = (25, 5, 20) and a′ = (25 + y, 5− y, 20) with y ∈ [0, 5] satisfy the conditions
imposed on the definition of NDC: a1 = 25 ≥ 0− 10 = maxC2−maxC1, a2 = 5 ≥ 0− 0 =
maxC3 −maxC2. Cγ (a) and Cγ (a′) are described in Figure 1.
Given i ∈ N1, the NDC property says that
ei
(
C1 (a′) , 25 + y
)
+ ei
(
C2 (a′) , 5− y
)
+ ei
(
C3 (a′) , 20
)
≥ ei
(
C1 (a) , 25
)
+ ei
(
C2 (a) , 5
)
+ ei
(
C3 (a) , 20
)
.
Given i ∈ N2, the NDC property says nothing (since we assume γi 	= 2).
Given i ∈ N3, the NDC property says that
ei
(
C3 (a′) , 20
)
≥ ei
(
C3 (a) , 20
)
.
We now present the characterization.
Theorem 3. A rule f satisfies PM and CM if and only if f = f e for some extra-costs
correspondence e satisfying the NDC property.
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Proof of Theorem 3. See the Appendix.
In the literature some authors studied families of rules satisfying both monotonicity
properties. The Equal Remaining Obligations (ERO) was originally introduced by Feltkamp
et al. (1994) and later studied in Brânzei et al. (2004) and Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga
(2007), among others2. The optimistic weighted Shapley rules are a family of rules defined
by Bergantiños and Lorenzo-Freire (2008a, 2008b). Obligation rules were introduced by
Tijs et al. (2006) and studied later in Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) and Bergantiños
and Kar (2010). The ERO rule is a optimistic weighted Shapley rule. Besides, optimistic
weighted Shapley rules are a subset of obligation rules.
We now show how these rules can be included in our family.
Proposition 3.
1. Obligation rules are the rules fe where for each (C∗, x) and each i ∈ N ,
ei (C
∗, x) = oi (N) x
where o is a function o that assigns to each N a vector o ∈ ∆(N) such that oi (S) ≥
oi (N) for all i ∈ S ⊂ N .
2. Optimistic weighted Shapley rules are the rules f e such that for each (C∗, x) and each
i ∈ N ,
ei (C
∗, x) =
ωi∑
i∈N ωi
x.
where ω ∈ RU+.
3. The ERO rule is the rule f e where for each (C∗, x) and each i ∈ N
ei (C
∗, x) =
1
|N |
x.
Proof of Proposition 3. See the Appendix.
It is clear, from Proposition 3, that the ERO rule is a particular case of an optimistic
weighted Shapley rule, and those are also obligation rules. Hence, our paper provides a
unified framework for all these rules.
Theorem 3 can also be used for identifying classes of rules satisfying PM andCM different
from the class of rules studied in Proposition 3. We do it in the following. Let {ox}x∈R+
be a parametric family of obligation functions, i.e. for each x ∈ R+, ox (N) ∈ ∆(N) and
oxi (S) ≥ o
x
i (N) for all i ∈ S  N . We assume o
x
i (N) is an integrable function of x for all
i ∈ N and ∫ a+c
a
oxi (S) dx ≥
∫ b+c
b
oxi (N) dx (3)
2It is also known as the folk rule.
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for all i ∈ S  N and a, b, c ∈ R+.
Proposition 4. Let {ox}x∈R+ be defined as before. The rule f
e with e defined as
ei (C
∗, x) =
∫ x
0
oti (N) dt
for all (C∗, x) and i ∈ N , satisfies CM and PM.
Proof of Proposition 4. See the Appendix.
Clearly, this family contains the obligation rules (simply take ox = o for all x). Moreover,
not all the obligation rules can be defined in this way. Take for example oˆ = {oˆx}x∈R+ defined
as follows:
oˆxi (N) :=

1
|N |
if |N | 	= 2
1+1x≤1
3
if |N | = 2 and i = minj∈N j
2−1x≤1
3
if |N | = 2 and i = maxj∈N j
for all i ∈ N , where 1x≤1 = 1 if x ≤ 1 and 1x≤1 = 0 otherwise. The resulting rule f oˆ satisfies
all the previous properties. It is similar to the ERO rule, but it charges a higher obligation to
nodes with low index when the costs are higher (and vice-versa). It is not a obligation rule.
For example, take N = {1, 2} and, for z ∈ {1, 2}, let
(
N,C
(z)
0
)
be defined as c
(z)
01 = c
(z)
02 = z
and c
(z)
12 = 0. Then,
f oˆ1
(
C
(1)
0
)
= 1−
(
1−
∫ 1
0
2
3
dx
)
=
2
3
f oˆ2
(
C
(1)
0
)
= 1−
(
1−
∫ 1
0
1
3
dx
)
=
1
3
whereas
f oˆ1
(
C
(2)
0
)
= 2−
(
2−
∫ 1
0
2
3
dx−
∫ 2
1
1
3
dx
)
= 1
f oˆ2
(
C
(2)
0
)
= 2−
(
2−
∫ 1
0
1
3
dx−
∫ 2
1
2
3
dx
)
= 1.
Since f oˆ
(
C
(2)
0
)
	= 2f oˆ
(
C
(1)
0
)
, we deduce that f oˆ does not satisfy additivity (Brânzei
et al., 2004, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2006). Since all the obligation rules are additive
(Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire, 2009), we conclude that f oˆ is not an obligation rule.
6 Concluding remarks
In this section we summarize the main findings of the paper. Our main objective is to study
in mcstp the rules satisfying PM and CM.
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Given a mcstp, its irreducible problem is obtained by reducing the cost of the arcs as
much as possible, but without changing the total cost associated with anymt. The irreducible
core is the core of the irreducible problem and it is an non-empty subset of the core. Our first
result says that the set of allocations induced by the rules satisfying PM and CM coincides
with the irreducible core.
We introduce the concept of neighborhood. We say that a group of agents S are in a
neighborhood if any connection cost between any agent of the neighborhood and any agent
outside the neighborhood is larger than any connection cost between any pair of agents in
the neighborhood. We define δS as the difference between the previous amounts. This δS
can be interpreted as the extra cost of connecting the agents in S with the agents outside S.
An extra cost correspondence specifies how to divide the extra cost δS among the agents in
S.
Our second result says that the set of rules satisfying SEP and RED coincides with the
set of rules induced by extra cost correspondences.
Our third result says the set of rules satisfying PM and CM coincides with the set of
rules induced by extra cost correspondences satisfying the NDC property.
We also explain how some rules of the literature satisfying PM and CM can be expressed
in terms of extra cost correspondences. Besides, with the help of our result, we identify a
new class of rules satisfying PM and CM .
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7 Appendix
We prove the results of the paper.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let (N0, C0) be a mcstp. We first prove that IC (N0, C0) ⊂ AM (N0, C0). It is well known
that vC∗
0
is a concave game. Thus, the core of vC∗
0
is the convex hull of the family of vector
of marginal contributions.
Hence, given x = (xi)i∈N ∈ IC (N0, C0), there exists w = (wπ)π∈ΠN ∈ ∆(ΠN) such that
for each i ∈ N,
xi =
∑
π∈ΠN
wπ
[
vC∗
0
(Pre (i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗
0
(Pre (i, π))
]
.
Let π ∈ ΠN . We define the rule fπ such that for each S ⊂ N and each i ∈ S,
fπi (S0, (CS)0) = vC∗ (Pre (i, πS) ∪ {i})− vC∗ (Pre (i, πS))
where πS denotes the order induced by π among the agents in S.
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This rule fπ is well defined because∑
i∈N
fπi (N0, C0) = vC∗0 (N) = m (N0, C
∗
0 ) = m (N0, C0) .
For each w = (wπ)π∈ΠN ∈ ∆(ΠN) , we define the rule f
w =
∑
π∈ΠN
wπf
π. Thus, for each
i ∈ N
xi =
∑
π∈ΠN
wπf
π
i (N0, C0) = f
w
i (N0, C0) .
It only remains to prove that fw satisfies PM and CM. Using Proposition 3.3 in Bergan-
tiños and Vidal-Puga (2007) it is not difficult to prove that for each S ⊂ N, i /∈ S
vC∗
0
(S ∪ {i})− vC∗
0
(S) = min
k∈S∪{0}
{c∗ik} .
We prove that for each π ∈ ΠN , fπ satisfies PM . Let S ⊂ T ⊂ N , and i ∈ S. Under (1),
it is straightforward to check that ((CT )
∗)S ≤ (CS)
∗. Since Pre (i, πS) ⊂ Pre (i, πT ),
fπi (T0, (CT )0) = min
k∈Pre(i,πT )∪{0}
{c∗ik} ≤ min
k∈Pre(i,πS)∪{0}
{c∗ik} = f
π
i (S0, (CS)0) .
We prove that for each π ∈ ΠN , fπ satisfies CM . Let (N0, C0) and (N0, C ′0) be such that
C0 ≤ C
′
0. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007, Lemma 4.2) prove that C
∗
0 ≤ C
′∗
0 . Now,
fπi (N0, C0) = min
k∈Pre(i,π)∪{0}
{c∗ik} ≤ min
k∈Pre(i,π)∪{0}
{c′∗ik} = f
π
i (N0, C
′
0) .
Since for each π ∈ ΠN , f
π satisfies PM and CM , it is not difficult to check that for each
w = (wπ)π∈ΠN ∈ ∆(ΠN) , f
w =
∑
π∈ΠN
wπf
π satisfies PM and CM.
Finally, we prove that AM (N0, C0) ⊂ IC (N0, C0) . Let x ∈ AM (N0, C). There exists
a rule f satisfying CM and PM such that x = f (N0, C0) . It is not difficult to check that
if f satisfies PM then f (N0, C0) ∈ core (N, vC0) . Besides, CM implies RED. Therefore,
f (N0, C0) = f (N0, C
∗
0 ) ∈ core
(
N, vC∗
0
)
= IC (N0, C0) . 
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
(1) Assume that S is a neighborhood in C0. Because of the definition of the irreducible
matrix, we have that min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
cij = min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
c∗ij. Let τS ∈ T (S) be an mcst in (S,CS).
Since S is a neighborhood in C0, τS is also an optimal tree in (S, (CS)
∗). Let C1 = (CS)
∗
and let C2 = (C∗)S. Given i, j ∈ S, let τ ij ⊂ τS be the (unique) path from i to j. Then,
c1ij = max
{k,l}∈τ ij
ckl = c
∗
kl = c
2
ij
and hence(CS)
∗ = (C∗)S.
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Because of the definition of C∗ we have that max
(i,j)∈τS
cij = max
(i,j)∈τS
c∗ij = max
(i,j)∈S
c∗ij. Now,
δ∗S = min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
c∗ij − max
{i,j}∈τS
c∗ij
= min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
cij − max
{i,j}∈τS
cij = δS
which means that S is a neighborhood in C∗0 .
The reciprocal is similar and we omit it.
(2) ”⊃” Let j ∈ N be such that c∗ij < min
k∈S,l∈N0\S
c∗kl. If j /∈ S, then c
∗
ij ≥ min
k∈S,l∈N0\S
c∗kl,
which is a contradiction. Hence, j ∈ S.
”⊂”: Let j ∈ N be such that c∗ij ≥ min
k∈S,l∈N0\S
c∗kl. If j ∈ S, then
δS = min
k∈S,l∈N0\S
c∗kl −max
k,l∈S
c∗kl ≤ c
∗
ij − c
∗
ij = 0
which cannot be true because S is a neighborhood. Hence, j /∈ S.
(3) Let i ∈ S ∩ S′. If min
k∈S,l∈N0\S
c∗kl ≤ min
k∈S′,l∈N0\S′
c∗kl then it follows from Proposition 1.2
that S ⊂ S ′. If min
k∈S′,l∈N0\S′
c∗kl ≤ min
k∈S,l∈N0\S
c∗kl then it follows from Proposition 1.2 that S
′ ⊂ S.
(4) It follows from Proposition 1.3.
(5) Assume {(0, i)}i∈N is not an mcst. Let {k, l} ⊂ N be such that ckl = min
i,j∈N
cij. Thus,
ckl < min
i∈N
c0i. Then, S = {k} ∪
{
i ∈ N : max
{j,j′}∈τ ik
cjj′ ≤ ckl
}
is a neighborhood in C0.
Assume {(0, i)}i∈N is an mcst. Then, given any S ⊂ N , we have min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
cij = min
i∈S
c0i
and max
{i,j}∈τ(S)
cij ≥ min
i∈S
c0i. Hence
δS = min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
cij − max
{i,j}∈τ(S)
cij ≤ 0
and S is not a neighborhood. 
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let (N0, C0) ∈ C0. Then,∑
i∈N
f ei (N0, C0) =
∑
i∈N
c∗0i −
∑
i∈N
∑
S neighborhood
i∈S
(δS − ei (C
∗
S, δS))
=
∑
i∈N
c∗0i −
∑
S neighborhood
(∑
i∈S
(δS − ei (C
∗
S, δS))
)
=
∑
i∈N
c∗0i −
∑
S neighborhood
(|S| − 1) δS.
Thus, it is enough to prove that for each mcstp (N0, C0),
m (C0) +
∑
S neighborhood
(|S| − 1) δS =
∑
i∈N
c∗0i.
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Assume first there exists no neighborhood. Under Proposition 1.5, {{0, i}}i∈N is an mcst
in (N0, C0). Hence, {{0, i}}i∈N is also an mcst in (N0, C
∗
0 ) and the result is easily checked.
Assume now that there are exactly k > 0 neighborhoods and the result is true when
there exists less than k neighborhoods. Let S′ be a minimal neighborhood (there is no
neighborhood S such that S  S′). Let τS′ denote a mcst in S ′. Since S ′ is minimal, there
exists α ≥ 0 such that cij = α for all (i, j) ∈ τS′ .
Let t be a mcst in (N0, C0). We define C
′
0 as c
′
ij = α + δS′ if {i, j} ⊂ S
′ and c′ij = cij
otherwise. It is not difficult to check that:
• t is also an mcst in (N0, C ′0);
• c′∗0i = c
∗
0i for all i ∈ N ;
• m (C ′0) = m (C0) + (|S
′| − 1) δS′ ; and
• {S : S is a neighborhood in C ′0} = {S : S is a neighborhood in C0} \ {S
′} .
Now, applying the induction hypothesis, we have
m (C0) +
∑
S neighborhood in C0
(|S| − 1) δS
= m (C ′0)− (|S
′| − 1) δS′ +
∑
S neighborhood in C0
(|S| − 1) δS
= m (C ′0) +
∑
S neighborhood in C′
0
(|S| − 1) δS
=
∑
i∈N
c′∗0i =
∑
i∈N
c∗0i. 
7.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Let e be any extra-costs correspondence and fe be the associated rule. It is obvious that f e
satisfies RED.
Given (N0, C0) ∈ C0, let Ne (N0, C0) denote the set of neighborhoods in (N0, C0).
In order to prove that f e also satisfy SEP , let S ⊂ N such thatm (N0, C0) = m (S0, (CS)0)+
m
(
(N\S)0 ,
(
CN\S
)
0
)
. Given i ∈ S, it is straightforward to check that Ne (N0, C0) =
Ne (S0, (CS)0) ∪Ne
(
(N\S)0 ,
(
CN\S
)
0
)
. Hence, f ei (N0, C0) = f
e
i (S0, (CS)0) and this proves
that f is separable.
We now prove that if f satisfies SEP and RED, then f = f e for some extra-costs
correspondence e. Let f be such a rule.
Given (N,C∗) ∈ C∗ and a ∈ R+, we define
(
N0, C
∗(a)
0
)
∈ C0 as the mcstp given by
c
∗(a)
ij = c
∗
ij for all i, j ∈ N and c
∗(a)
0i = a for all i ∈ N . It is straightforward to check that
C
∗(a)
0 ∈ C
∗
0 when a ≥ maxC
∗.
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For all C∗ ∈ C∗, x ∈ R+, and i ∈ N we define
ei (C
∗, x) = fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗+x)
0
)
− fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗)
0
)
.
Given i /∈ N we define ei (C∗, x) = 0.
We first prove that e is an extra-costs correspondence. By definition, ei (C
∗, x) = 0 for
all (N,C∗) ∈ C∗, x ∈ R+, i /∈ N . Besides,∑
i∈U
ei (C
∗, x) =
∑
i∈N
ei (C
∗, x)
= m
(
C
∗(maxC∗+x)
0
)
−m
(
C
∗(maxC∗)
0
)
= m (C∗) + maxC∗ + x−m (C∗)−maxC∗
= x.
Hence, e is an extra-costs correspondence.
We need to prove that f = f e. We proceed by induction on the number of neighborhoods
Ne (C0). Assume |Ne (C0)| = 0.
Under Proposition 1.5, {(0, i)}i∈N is a mcst in C0. Since f satisfies SEP , fi (C0) =
fi
(
{i}0 ,
(
C{i}
)
0
)
= c0i. Besides, since {(0, i)}i∈N is an mcst in C0, we have c0i = c
∗
0i for all
i ∈ N and hence fe (C0) = f (C0).
Assume now the result is true for mcstp with less than |Ne (C0)| neighborhoods.
Assume first that maxC∗ ≥ max
i∈N
c∗0i. It is not difficult to check that N is separable,
namely, there exists S ⊂ N, S 	= ∅, and S 	= N such that m (N0, C0) = m (S0, (CS)0) +
m
(
(N\S)0 ,
(
CN\S
)
0
)
. Under SEP , fi (N0, C0) = fi (S0, (CS)0) for all i ∈ S and fi (N0, C0) =
fi
(
(N\S)0 ,
(
CN\S
)
0
)
for all i ∈ N\S. Repeating this argument we can find a partition
{S1, ..., Sp} of N satisfying that for each k = 1, ...p maxC
∗
Sk
< max
i∈Sk
c∗0i and fi (N0, C0) =
fi
(
(Sk)0 , (CSk)0
)
for each i ∈ Sk.
Hence, we can assume maxC∗ < max
i∈N
c∗0i. Since C
∗ is irreducible, max
i∈N
c∗0i = c
∗
0i for
all i ∈ N . Hence, N ∈ Ne (C0) and δN = max
i∈N
c∗i0 − maxC
∗. Since f satisfies RED,
f (C0) = f (C
∗
0). Now, given i ∈ N ,
fi (C0) = fi (C
∗
0 ) = fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗+δN )
0
)
= ei (C
∗, δN ) + fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗)
0
)
.
Let C ′0 = C
∗(maxC∗)
0 . It is straightforward to check that C
′
0 is irreducible. Besides,
Ne (C∗0 ) = Ne (C
′
0) ∪ {N}. For each S ∈ Ne (C
′
0), δS = δ
′
S, and c
′∗
i0 = c
∗
i0 − δN . Hence,
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applying the induction hypothesis, for each i ∈ N ,
fi (C0) = ei (C
∗, δN) + fi (C
′
0)
= ei (C
∗, δN) + c
′∗
0i +
∑
S∈Ne(C′0)
(ei (C
∗
S, δS)− δS)
= ei (C
∗, δN) + c
∗
0i − δN +
∑
S∈Ne(C′0)
(ei (C
∗
S, δS)− δS)
= c∗0i +
∑
S∈Ne(C∗0)
(ei (C
∗
S, δS)− δS)
= fei (C0) . 
7.5 Proof of Theorem 3
We start the proof with the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. (i) Given (N ′, C ′) , (N ′′, C ′′) ∈ C∗ and a ∈ R+ with N ′ ∩ N ′′ = ∅ and
a ≥ maxC ′′ −maxC ′, then C ′ ⊕a C ′′ ∈ C∗.
(ii) Given a disjoint sequence {(Nγ, Cγ)}Γγ=1 ⊂ C
∗, Γ > 1, a ∈ RΓ+ with aγ ≥ maxC
γ+1−
maxCγ for all γ = 1, ...,Γ − 1, and y ∈ [0, a2], then Cγ (a) ∈ C∗ and Cγ (a′) ∈ C∗ for all
γ = 1, ...,Γ, where a′ = (a1 + y, a2 − y, a3, ..., aΓ).
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Let C = C ′⊕aC ′′. It is easily checked that a+maxC ′ = maxC.
Hence, we can find a mcst t in C and C∗ such that t = t1 ∪ t2 ∪ {(k1, k2)} where t1 is a
mcst in C ′, t2 is a mcst in C ′′, k1 ∈ N1 and k2 ∈ N2. Since ck1k2 = maxC ≥ cij for all
(i, j) ∈ t1 ∪ t2 we can deduce, using the definition of irreducible matrix, that C = C∗.
(ii) We assume γ > 1, since the case γ = 1 is trivial. We proceed by induction on Γ. For
Γ = 2, the result follows from (i) because a′1 = a1 + y ≥ a1 ≥ maxC
2 − maxC1. Assume
the result is true for sequences with less than Γ mcstp’s, Γ ≥ 3. Under the induction
hypothesis, we have Cγ (b), Cγ (b′) ∈ C∗ where γ = 1, ...,Γ − 1, b = (a1, ..., aΓ−1) and
b′ = (a1 + y, a2 − y, a3, ..., aΓ−1). Now, it is clear that Cγ (a) = Cγ (b) and Cγ (a′) = Cγ (b′)
for all γ = 1, ...,Γ− 1. Hence, the result holds for any γ < Γ. Assume now γ = Γ. We have
CΓ (a)
(2)
= CΓ−1 (a)⊕aΓ−1 C
Γ (a)
(i)
∈ C∗
and
CΓ (a′)
(2)
= CΓ−1 (a′)⊕a′
Γ−1
CΓ (a′) .
In order to apply (i) to this last expression (so that CΓ (a′) ∈ C∗) we have to prove that
a′Γ−1 ≥ maxC
Γ (a′)−maxCΓ−1 (a′) . (4)
It is straightforward to check that maxCγ (a′) = maxCγ (a) for all γ 	= 2, whereas
maxC2 (a′) = maxC2 (a) + y. Hence, for Γ > 3,
maxCΓ (a′)−maxCΓ−1 (a′) = maxCΓ (a)−maxCΓ−1 (a) ≤ aΓ−1 = a
′
Γ−1
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and for Γ = 3,
maxC3 (a′)−maxC2 (a′) = maxC3 (a)−maxC2 (a)− y ≤ a2 − y = a
′
2. 
We now prove that if f = f e with e satisfying NDC, then f satisfies CM and PM .
Following Norde et al (2004), we define the set ΣN0 of linear orders on the arcs of C0
as the set of all bijections σ :
{
1, ...,
(
n+1
n
)}
→ {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N0}. For each mcstp (N0, C0),
there exists at least one linear order σ ∈ ΣN0 such that cσ(1) ≤ cσ(2) ≤ ... ≤ cσ((n+1n ))
. For
any σ ∈ ΣN0 , we define the set
Kσ =
{
C0 ∈ C
N
0 : cσ(k) ≤ cσ(k+1) for all k = 1, 2, ...
}
,
which we call the Kruskal cone with respect to σ. One can easily see that
⋃
σ∈ΣN0
Kσ = CN0 .
We say that a nonempty set S ⊂ N is a quasi-neighborhood in C0 if δS ≥ 0. Let
qNe (C0) = {S ⊂ N,S 	= ∅ : δS ≥ 0} denote the set of quasi-neighborhoods in C0. Clearly,
Ne (C0) ⊂ Ne (C0).
We now prove that f satisfies CM . It is enough to prove that f (N0, C0) ≤ f (N0, C ′0)
when there exists {k, l} ⊂ N0 such that c′kl > ckl and c
′
ij = cij otherwise. Let (k, l), C0 and
C ′0 be defined in this way.
For any t ∈ [0, 1], the mcstp (N0, Ct0) defined as c
t
ij = (1− t) cij + tc
′
ij satisfies c
′
kl ≥ c
t
kl ≥
ckl and c
t
ij = cij otherwise. Since ΣN0 is a finite set, there exist a sequence {t
1, t2, ...tp} ⊂ [0, 1]
with t1 = 0 and tp = 1 such that, for all r, we have tr < tr+1 and Ct
r
and Ct
r+1
belong to
the same Kruskal cone.
Hence, it is enough to prove that f (N0, C0) ≤ f (N0, C ′0) when both C0 and C
′
0 belong
to the same Kruskal cone. An immediate consequence is that there exists a common mcst t
in both C0 and C
′
0.
Since f satisfies RED, f (N0, C0) = f (N0, C
∗
0 ). If {k, l} /∈ t, then C
∗
0 = C
′∗
0 . Thus
f (N0, C0) = f (N0, C
∗
0 ) = f (N0, C
′∗
0 ) = f (N0, C
′
0) .
Hence, we assume {k, l} ∈ t. This implies ckl = c∗kl and c
′
kl = c
′∗
kl. Let α = c
′∗
kl − c
∗
kl > 0.
Another consequence of C0, C
′
0 being in the same Kruskal cone is that, for any S ⊂ N ,
|S| > 1, there exist i1, i2, j2 ∈ S, j1 ∈ N0\S with {i2, j2} ∈ τ (S) such that
δS = min
i′∈S,j′∈N0\S
ci′j′ − max
{i′,j′}∈τ(S)
ci′j′ = ci1j1 − ci2j2 and
δ′S = min
i′∈S,j′∈N0\S
c′i′j′ − max
{i′,j′}∈τ(S)
c′i′j′ = c
′
i1j1 − c
′
i2j2 .
Thus δS and δ
′
S cannot have opposite sign. Namely, δS > 0 implies δ
′
S ≥ 0. From this, it
is straightforward to check that Ne (C0) ⊂ qNe (C ′0) and, analogously, Ne (C
′
0) ⊂ qNe (C0).
Given any X ⊂ 2N with Ne (C0) ⊆ X ⊆ qNe (C0) and i ∈ N we have
fi (N0, C0) = c
∗
i0 −
∑
i∈S∈X
(δS − ei (C
∗
S, δS)) . (5)
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The reason is that for any S ∈ qNe (C0) \Ne (C0), δS = 0 and hence δS − ei (C∗S, δS) =
0− ei (C∗S, 0) = 0.
We define X = Ne (C0) ∪ Ne (C ′0). Clearly, Ne (C0) ⊆ X ⊆ qNe (C0) and Ne (C
′
0) ⊆
X ⊆ qNe (C ′0).
Fix i ∈ N . We need to prove that fi (N0, C0) ≤ fi (N0, C ′0). Under (5), we have
fi (N0, C0) = c
∗
0i −
∑
i∈S∈X
(δS − ei (C
∗
S, δS))
fi (N0, C
′
0) = c
′∗
0i −
∑
i∈S∈X
(δ′S − ei (C
′∗
S , δ
′
S)) .
We have seen above that
δS = ci1j1 − ci2j2 and δ
′
S = c
′
i1j1 − c
′
i2j2
for some i1, i2, j2 ∈ S, j1 ∈ N0\S with {i2, j2} ∈ tS.
By hypothesis, cjj′ = c
′
jj′ for all {j, j
′} 	= {k, l}. Hence, δS = δ
′
S unless {i
1, j1} = {k, l}
or {i2, j2} = {k, l}.
Given S ∈ X and δS 	= δ
′
S we study both cases:
1. If {i1, j1} = {k, l}, then δ′S = δS + α. Besides, there can be at most two such S. One
of them contains node k (if any) and the other contains node l (if any). Assume, on
the contrary, that there exist two S ′ ∈ X,S 	= S ′ with k ∈ S ∩ S ′ (the case for l ∈ S is
analogous). Hence,
c′kl = c
′∗
kl = min
i′∈S,j′∈N0\S
c′∗i′j′ = min
i′∈S′,j′∈N0\S′
c′∗i′j′ .
Since k ∈ S ∩ S ′, under Proposition 1.4, S  S ′ or S′  S. Assume w.l.o.g. S  S ′.
Then,
c′∗kl = min
i′∈S,j′∈N0\S
c′∗i′j′ ≤ min
i′∈S,j′∈S′\S
c′∗i′j′
≤ max
i′,j′∈S′
c′∗i′j′ ≤ min
i′∈S′,j′∈N0\S′
c′∗i′j′ = c
′∗
kl
which implies that no inequality is strict. In particular, max
i′,j′∈S′
c′∗i′j′ = c
′∗
kl. Since {k, l} 
S ′, max
i′,j′∈S′
c′∗i′j′ = max
i′,j′∈S′
c∗i′j′ and hence
δS′ = min
i′∈S′,j′∈N0\S′
c∗i′j′ − max
i′,j′∈S′
c∗i′j′ = c
∗
kl − c
′∗
kl = −α < 0,
which is a contradiction.
2. If {i2, j2} = {k, l}, then δ′S = δS − α. Besides, there can be at most one such S.
Assume, on the contrary, that there exists S′ ∈ X, S 	= S ′, k, l ∈ S ∩ S ′, and
ckl = c
∗
kl = max
i′,j′∈S
c∗i′j′ = max
i′,j′∈S′
c∗i′j′.
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Since k ∈ S ∩ S ′, under Proposition 1.4, S  S ′ or S ′  S. Assume w.l.o.g. S  S ′.
Then,
c∗kl = max
i′,j′∈S
c∗i′j′ ≤ min
i′∈S,j′∈N0\S
c∗i′j′ ≤ min
i′∈S,j′∈S′\S
c∗i′j′ ≤ max
i′,j′∈S′
c∗i′j′ = c
∗
kl
which implies that no inequality is strict. Thus, min
i′∈S,j′∈N0\S
c∗i′j′ = c
∗
kl and hence
δS = min
i′∈S,j′∈N0\S
c∗i′j′ − max
i′,j′∈S
c∗i′j′ = c
∗
kl − c
∗
kl = 0,
which implies δ′S = δS − α = −α < 0, which is a contradiction.
Let Sk =
{
j ∈ N0 : c′∗kj < c
′∗
kl
}
and let Sl =
{
j ∈ N0 : c′∗kj < c
′∗
kl
}
. Both Sk and Sl are
nonempty (because k ∈ Sk and l ∈ Sl) and disjoint (it follows from {k, l} ∈ t). Since they
are disjoint, we can assume w.l.o.g. 0 /∈ Sk. Let S1 = Sk. If |S1| > 1, then
l /∈ S1,
c′∗kl = min
i′∈S1,j′∈N0\S1
c′∗i′j′ ,
δ′S1 = c
′∗
kl − max
i′,j′∈S
c′∗i′j′ > 0
and hence either S1 ∈ Ne (C
′
0) or S1 = {k}.
Assume that S1 ∈ Ne (C ′0) . Since C0 and C
′
0 are in the same Kruskal cone, δS1 =
c∗i1j1−c
∗
i2j2 and δ
′
S1
= c′∗i1j1−c
′∗
i2j2 . Since δ
′
S1
> 0 we deduce that δS1 ≥ 0. Hence S1 ∈ qNe (C0) .
Now, it is not difficult to check that S1 satisfies condition 1. Hence δ
′
S1
= δS1 + α when
|S1| > 1.
Let S2 =
{
j ∈ N0 : c
∗
kj ≤ c
∗
kl
}
. Clearly, {k, l} ⊂ S2. Notice that if 0 ∈ S2 then S2 /∈ X.
It is straightforward to check that if 0 /∈ S2 then S2 ∈ X. Besides S1  S2 and there is no
S ∈ X, S 	= S1, such that S1  S  S2.
In case 0 /∈ S2, it is not difficult to check that S2 satisfies condition 2. Hence δ
′
S2
= δS2−α.
Let F = {S ∈ Ne (C0) : S1 ⊂ S, δS = δ
′
S} and let F
′ = {S ∈ Ne (C ′0) : S1 ⊂ S, δS = δ
′
S}.
It is not difficult to check that F = F ′ (F = F ′ = ∅ is also possible) and S1, S2 /∈ F . By
Proposition 1.3 we can assume F = {S3, S4, ..., SΓ} for some Γ ≥ 2 (Γ = 2 when F = ∅) and
Sγ  Sγ+1 for all γ = 3, ...,Γ− 1.
Let G = {S ∈ X : S1 ⊂ S}. Clearly, either G = {S1, ..., SΓ} (when S1 ∈ Ne (C ′0)) or
G = {S2, ..., SΓ} (when S1 = {k}). Besides, Sγ  Sγ+1 for all γ = 1, 2, ...,Γ− 1.
If i /∈ SΓ, it is straightforward to check that fi (N0, C0) = fi (N0, C ′0). We assume i ∈ Sγ
for some γ ∈ {1, ...,Γ}. Let γi be the minimum of these γ’s. We have two cases:
Case 1: Γ = 1. This means S2 /∈ X. Since δS2 ≥ 0, we have 0 ∈ S2, which implies
c∗0k ≤ c
∗
kl and also c
′∗
0k ≤ c
′∗
kl.
Subcase 1.1: S1 = {k} = {i}. This implies X = ∅ and hence
fi (N0, C
′
0)− fi (N0, C0) = c
′∗
0i − c
∗
0i ≥ 0.
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Subcase 1.2: S1 ∈ X. This implies c′∗0k ≥ c
′∗
kl and hence c
′∗
0k = c
′∗
kl. Thus c
′∗
i0 − c
∗
i0 = α
and C∗S1 = C
′∗
S1
. Hence,
fi (N0, C
′
0)− fi (N0, C0)
= c′∗0i −
(
δ′S1 − ei
(
C ′∗S1 , δ
′
S1
))
− c∗0i +
(
δS1 − ei
(
C∗S1, δS1
))
= c′∗0i − c
∗
0i −
(
δS1 + α− ei
(
C∗S1 , δS1 + α
))
+
(
δS1 − ei
(
C∗S1 , δS1
))
= ei
(
C∗S1 , δS1 + α
)
− ei
(
C∗S1 , δS1
)
≥ 0
where the last inequality comes from applying NDC to
{(
S1, C
∗
S1
)}
with Γ = 1, a1 = δS1
and y = α.
Case 2: Γ > 1. This means that S2 ∈ X and hence 0 /∈ Sl. Thus we can take S1 = Sk
or S1 = S
l. It is not difficult to check that S2 = S
k ∪ Sl. If i ∈ S2 we choose S1 such that
i ∈ S1. Thus, γi 	= 2 which implies c
′∗
0i = c
∗
0i.
In this case,
fi (N0, C
′
0)− fi (N0, C0)
= c′∗0i − c
∗
0i −
∑
i∈S∈X
(δ′S − δS − ei (C
′∗
S , δ
′
S) + ei (C
∗
S, δS)) .
For any S ∈ X\G with i ∈ S, we have C∗S = C
′∗
S , which also implies δS = δ
′
S. Hence,
fi (N0, C
′
0)− fi (N0, C0)
=
Γ∑
γ=γi
(
−δ′Sγ + δSγ + ei
(
C ′∗Sγ , δ
′
Sγ
)
− ei
(
C∗Sγ , δSγ
))
=
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei
(
C ′∗Sγ , δ
′
Sγ
)
−
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei
(
C∗Sγ , δSγ
)
−
Γ∑
γ=γi
(
δ′sγ − δsγ
)
.
The last term is zero, because δ′S1 = δS1 + α, δ
′
S2
= δS2 − α, and δ
′
Sγ
= δSγ otherwise
(remember that γi 	= 2). Hence,
fi (N0, C
′
0)− fi (N0, C0) =
Γ∑
γ=γi
(
ei
(
C ′∗Sγ , δ
′
Sγ
))
−
Γ∑
γ=γi
(
ei
(
C∗Sγ , δSγ
))
.
We now define {(Nγ, Cγ)}Γγ=1, a ∈ R
Γ
+ and y ∈ [0, a2] so that ei
(
C ′∗Sγ , δ
′
Sγ
)
= ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
and ei
(
C∗Sγ , δSγ
)
= ei (C
γ (a) , aγ) for all γ. Under NDC, this will prove that the above
expression is nonnegative.
Let N1 = S1, C
1 = C∗N1 , and a1 = δS1 . In general, for any γ = 2, ...,Γ, N
γ = Sγ\Sγ−1,
Cγ = (C∗)Nγ , and aγ = δSγ . We also define y = α. Since c
′∗
kl = c
∗
kl + α, it is straightforward
to check that α ≤ a2 and hence y ∈ [0, a2].
Clearly, C ′∗S1 = C
1. Now, we prove that C ′∗S2 = C
1 ⊕a1+α C
2 = C2 (a′). Let Cα = C ′∗S2 and
Cβ = C1 ⊕a1+α C
2. Clearly, Cα = (CS2 + αIkl)
∗.
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It is straightforward to check that cαij = c
β
ij for all i, j ∈ N
1 and all i, j ∈ N2. Let k1 ∈ N1
and k2 ∈ N2. Then,
cβ
k1k2
= maxC1 + a1 + α = maxC
1 + δS1 + α = min
i∈N1
j∈N0\N1
cij + α
= ckl + α = c
α
k1k2 .
Analogously, C ′∗S3 = (CS3 + αIkl)
∗ = (C1 ⊕a1+α C
2)⊕a2−αC
3 = C3 (a′) . In general, C ′∗Sγ =(
CSγ + αIkl
)∗
= C1 ⊕a1+α C
2 ⊕a1−α C
3 ⊕a3 ...⊕aγ−1 C
γ = Cγ (a′) for all γ = 3, ...,Γ.
Similarly, we can prove that C∗Sγ = C
γ (a) for all γ = 1, ...,Γ.
Hence, by applying NDC, we have
fi (N0, C
′
0)− fi (N0, C0) ≥ 0.
We now prove that f satisfies PM . Under Theorem 2, we know that f satisfies SEP . We
must prove that for each mcstp (N0, C0) and j ∈ N , fi (N0, C0) ≤ fi ((N\ {j})0 , C0) for all
i ∈ N\ {j}. Let (N0, C ′0) be defined as c
′
ii′ = cii′ for all i, i
′ ∈ N\ {j} and c′ij = maxCN0\{j}
for all i ∈ N0\ {j}. Clearly, m (N0, C ′0) = m
(
(N\ {j})0 ,
(
C ′N\{j}
)
0
)
+m
(
{j}0 ,
(
C ′{j}
)
0
)
.
Under SEP , fi (N0, C
′
0) = fi
(
(N\ {j})0 ,
(
C ′N\{j}
)
0
)
for all i ∈ N\ {j}. Given i ∈ N\ {j},
under CM ,
fi (N0, C0) ≤ fi (N0, C
′
0) = fi ((N\ {j})0 , C
′
0) = fi ((N\ {j})0 , C0) .
We now prove that if f satisfies CM and PM , then f = f e for some e satisfying NDC.
We define e as in the proof of Theorem 2. Namely, for all C∗ ∈ C∗, x ∈ R+, and i ∈ N ,
ei (C
∗, x) = fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗+x)
0
)
− fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗)
0
)
and ei (C
∗, x) = 0 for all i /∈ N . We already proved (proof of Theorem 2) that e is an
extra-costs correspondence and f = fe.
Hence, we only need to check that e satisfies NDC. Let {(Nγ , Cγ)}Γγ=1 ⊂ C
∗ be a disjoint
sequence with Γ ≥ 1, i ∈ Nγi with γi 	= 2, a ∈ R
Γ
+ with aγ ≥ maxC
γ+1 − maxCγ for all
γ = 1, ...,Γ− 1 and y ∈ [0, a2] (or simply y ≥ 0, when Γ = 1).
Assume first that Γ = 1. We need to prove
ei
(
C1, a1 + y
)
− ei
(
C1, a1
)
≥ 0.
Let C = C1. By definition,
ei (C, a1 + y)− ei (C, a1)
= fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗+a1+y)
0
)
− fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗)
0
)
− fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗+a1)
0
)
+ fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗)
0
)
= fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗+a1+y)
0
)
− fi
(
C
∗(maxC∗+a1)
0
)
≥ 0
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where the last inequality comes from the fact that C
∗(maxC∗+a1+y)
0 ≥ C
∗(maxC∗+a1)
0 and f
satisfy CM .
Assume now that Γ > 1. We need to prove
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
−
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei (C
γ (a) , aγ) ≥ 0
where a′ = (a1 + y, a2 − y, a3, ..., aΓ) and C
γ (b) = C1⊕b1C
2⊕b2 ...⊕bγ−1C
γ for all γ = 1, ...,Γ
and all b ∈ RΓ+.
By definition,
ei (C
∗, x) = fi (C
∗ ⊕x ({0} , 0))− fi (C
∗ ⊕0 ({0} , 0)) .
Under SEP , it is straightforward to check that
fi (C
γ (b)⊕0 ({0} , 0)) = fi
(
Cγ−1 (b)⊕bγ−1 ({0} , 0)
)
for all γ = γi + 1, ...,Γ and all b ∈ R
Γ
+. Now,
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
=
Γ∑
γ=γi
[
fi
(
Cγ (a′)⊕a′γ ({0} , 0)
)
− fi (C
γ (a′)⊕0 ({0} , 0))
]
= fi
(
CΓ (a′)⊕a′
Γ
({0} , 0)
)
− fi (C
γi (a′)⊕0 ({0} , 0))
and
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei (C
γ (a) , aγ) =
Γ∑
γ=γi
[
fi
(
Cγ (a)⊕aγ ({0} , 0)
)
− fi (C
γ (a)⊕0 ({0} , 0))
]
= fi
(
CΓ (a)⊕aΓ ({0} , 0)
)
− fi (C
γi (a)⊕0 ({0} , 0)) .
Hence,
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
−
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei (C
γ (a) , aγ) = fi (C
γi (a)⊕0 ({0} , 0))− fi (C
γi (a′)⊕0 ({0} , 0))
+fi
(
CΓ (a′)⊕a′
Γ
({0} , 0)
)
− fi
(
CΓ (a)⊕aΓ ({0} , 0)
)
.
Under CM , fi
(
CΓ (a′)⊕a′
Γ
({0} , 0)
)
≥ fi
(
CΓ (a′)⊕a′
Γ
({0} , 0)
)
.
We now prove that fi (C
γi (a)⊕0 ({0} , 0)) = fi (Cγi (a′)⊕0 ({0} , 0)). For γi = 1, C
1 (a) =
C1 (a′) = C1 and the result holds trivially. Assume γi > 2. Then, N
1 ∪ ... ∪Nγi−1 and Nγi
are two separable components in both Cγi (a)⊕0 ({0} , 0) and Cγi (a′)⊕0 ({0} , 0). Besides,
the restriction of C∗ to Nγi coincides in both mcstp. Under SEP , we obtain the result.
Hence,
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
−
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei (C
γ (a) , aγ) ≥ 0. 
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7.6 Proof of Proposition 3
(1) Using an obligation function o we can arrive at a cost allocation as follows. We compute
a mcst following Kruskal’s algorithm (Kruskal, 1956), which consists in to construct a tree
by sequentially adding arcs with the lowest cost and without introducing cycles. The cost
of each arc selected by Kruskal’s algorithm is divided among the agents who benefit from
adding this arc. Each of these agents pays the difference between her obligation to two
groups, one in which she belonged before the arc was added and the one after. We now
define an obligation rule, f o, formally.
Given a network g we define P (g) = {Tk (g)}
n(g)
k=1 as the partition of N0 in connected
components induced by g. Namely, P (g) is the only partition of N0 satisfying the following
two properties: Firstly, if i, j ∈ Tk (g) , i and j are connected in g. Secondly, if i ∈ Tk, j ∈ Tl,
and k 	= l, then i and j are not connected in g. Given a network g, let S (P (g) , i) denote
the element of P (g) to which i belongs to.
Given an mcstp (N0, C0) , let g
|N | be a tree obtained applying Kruskal’s algorithm to
(N0, C0) , and for each p = 1, ..., |N | , (ip, jp) is the arc selected by Kruskal’s algorithm at
Stage p and gp the set of arcs selected by Kruskal’s algorithm at stages 1, ..., p. For each
i ∈ N , we define the obligation rule associated with the obligation function o as
f oi (N0, C0) =
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp
(
oi
(
S
(
P
(
gp−1
)
, i
))
− oi (S (P (g
p) , i))
)
where by convention, oi (T ) = 0 if 0 ∈ T.
Tijs et al (2006) prove that f o is well defined, namely, it is independent of the mcst
obtained following Kruskal’s algorithm.
We prove that if f o is an obligation rule, then f o = fe where e (C∗, x) = xoi (N) for each
(N,C∗) and x.
We proceed by induction on the number of agents. If |N | = 1 the result holds trivially.
Assume that fo = f e when |N | < q and we prove it when |N | = q.
Let (N0, C0) be an mcstp. Since f
o and f e satisfy CM, it is enough to prove that
f o (N0, C
∗
0) = f
e (N0, C
∗
0) .
Let t = {(πs−1, πs)}
|N |
s=1 be an mcst in (N0, C
∗
0 ) as in Proposition 3.1 of Bergantiños and
Vidal-Puga (2007). Without loss of generality we assume that πs = s for each s = 1, ..., |N | .
We consider two cases.
1. There exists s > 1 such that c∗s−1,s ≥ c
∗
r−1,r for all r = 1, ..., |N | . Let S = {1, ..., s− 1} .
Under Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007) we deduce that
m (N0, C
∗
0) = m (S0, C
∗
0 ) +m ((N\S)0 , C
∗
0 ) .
Let i ∈ S. Since f o and f e satisfy SEP, we deduce that
f oi (N0, C
∗
0 ) = f
o
i (S0, C
∗
0) and f
e
i (N0, C
∗
0 ) = f
e
i (S0, C
∗
0) .
By induction hypothesis f oi (S0, C
∗
0 ) = f
e
i (S0, C
∗
0 ) . Hence, f
o
i (N0, C
∗
0 ) = f
e
i (N0, C
∗
0 ) .
Similarly we can prove that f oi (N0, C
∗
0 ) = f
e
i (N0, C
∗
0 ) when i ∈ N\S.
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2. c∗01 > c
∗
r−1,r for all r = 2, ..., |N | . Let α = c
∗
01 − max
r=2,...,|N |
{
c∗r−1,r
}
. Let C ′∗0 be the
irreducible matrix associated with the tree t and the cost function c′ where c′01 = c
∗
01−α
and c′r−1,r = c
∗
r−1,r for all r = 2, ..., |N | .
Since C ′∗0 is under the conditions of the previous case, we have that f
o (N0, C
′∗
0 ) =
f e (N0, C
′∗
0 ) . Thus, it is enough to prove that for all i ∈ N,
f oi (N0, C
∗
0 )− f
o
i (N0, C
′∗
0 ) = f
e
i (N0, C
∗
0 )− f
e
i (N0, C
′∗
0 ) .
Fix i ∈ N . We first compute f oi (N0, C
∗
0) − f
o
i (N0, C
′∗
0 ) . We can apply Kruskal’s
algorithm to both C∗0 and C
′∗
0 in such a way that:
• The arc selected at each stage belongs to t. Namely, for each p = 1, ..., |N | ,
(ip (C∗0) , j
p (C∗0)) ∈ t and (i
p (C ′∗0 ) , j
p (C ′∗0 )) ∈ t.
• The arc selected at each stage is the same in both problems. Namely, for each
p = 1, ..., |N | , (ip (C∗0 ) , j
p (C∗0 )) = (i
p (C ′∗0 ) , j
p (C ′∗0 )).
• The last arc selected is (0, 1) .Namely,
(
i|N | (C∗0) , j
|N | (C∗0 )
)
=
(
i|N | (C ′∗0 ) , j
|N | (C ′∗0 )
)
=
(0, 1) .
Thus,
foi (N0, C
∗
0 )− f
o
i (N0, C
′∗
0 ) = c
∗
01oi (N)− c
′∗
01oi (N)
= αoi (N) .
We now compute f ei (N0, C
∗
0 )− f
e
i (N0, C
′∗
0 ) . It is straightforward to check that if S is
a neighborhood of node i in C ′∗0 , then S is also a neighborhood of i in C
∗
0 . Besides, N
is the unique neighborhood of i in C∗0 which is not a neighborhood of i in C
′∗
0 . Thus,
f ei (N0, C
∗
0 )− f
e
i (N0, C
′∗
0 ) = c
∗
0i − (δN − ei (C
∗
N , δN ))− c
′∗
0i.
It is straightforward to check that δN = α. Hence,
fei (N0, C
∗
0 )− f
e
i (N0, C
′∗
0 ) = ei (C
∗
N , α) = αoi (N) .
Using arguments similar to those used above we can prove that if f e is associated with
some e as in the statement, then f e = f o where o (N) = e (C∗, 1) . Notice that, by hypothesis,
o (N) does not depend on C∗.
(2) I is a trivial consequence of part (1) and the definition of optimistic weighted Shapley
rules.
(3) I is a trivial consequence of part (1) and the definition of the ERO rule. 
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7.7 Proof of Proposition 4
We prove that the extra-cost correspondence e satisfies the NDC property, which implies,
under Theorem 3, that f e satisfies CM and PM.
Consider a disjoint sequence {(Nγ, Cγ)}Γγ=1 ⊂ C
∗, i ∈ Nγi ⊂ N with γi 	= 2, a ∈ R
Γ
+ with
aγ ≥ maxCγ+1−maxCγ for all γ = 1, ...,Γ− 1, and y ∈ [0, a2] (y ≥ 0 when Γ = 1). We will
prove that
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
≥
Γ∑
γ=γi
ei (C
γ (a) , aγ) .
If Γ = 1 the result is straightforward. Assume now that Γ > 1. Since a′γ = aγ when
γ ≥ 3,
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
=
∫ a′γ
0
oxi
(
N1 ∪ ... ∪Nγ
)
dx
=
∫ aγ
0
oxi
(
N1 ∪ ... ∪Nγ
)
dx = ei (C
γ (a) , aγ)
for all γ ≥ 3.
In particular, if γi ≥ 3 the inequality holds. Hence, we assume i ∈ N
1. We know that
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
= ei (C
γ (a) , aγ) for all γ ≥ 3. Thus, it is enough to prove that
2∑
γ=1
ei
(
Cγ (a′) , a′γ
)
≥
2∑
γ=1
ei (C
γ (a) , aγ) .
We make some computations:
ei
(
C1 (a′) , a′1
)
=
∫ a′1
0
oxi
(
N1
)
dx =
∫ a1+y
0
oxi
(
N1
)
dx
ei
(
C2 (a′) , a′2
)
=
∫ a′
2
0
oxi
(
N1 ∪N2
)
dx =
∫ a2−y
0
oxi
(
N1 ∪N2
)
dx
ei
(
C1 (a) , a1
)
=
∫ a1
0
oxi
(
N1
)
dx, and
ei
(
C2 (a) , a2
)
=
∫ a2
0
oxi
(
N1 ∪N2
)
dx.
Thus, the inequality holds if and only if∫ a1+y
0
oxi
(
N1
)
dx+
∫ a2−y
0
oxi
(
N1 ∪N2
)
dx ≥
∫ a1
0
oxi
(
N1
)
dx+
∫ a2
0
oxi
(
N1 ∪N2
)
dx.
Equivalently, ∫ a1+y
a1
oxi
(
N1
)
dx ≥
∫ a2
a2−y
oxi
(
N1 ∪N2
)
dx
which is a particular case of the condition given in (3). 
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